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Abstract: The role of the UK Supreme Court as conventionally understood is to give effect 
to, and not to challenge, the will of Parliament. At the same time, the UK’s constitution 
forces the UKSC to develop a constitutional jurisprudence to resolve clashes of higher-order 
principles, for instance between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This 
development puts the legitimacy of unelected and unaccountable judges invalidating 
legislation under the spotlight. Instead of arguing for US-style strike-down powers, I argue 
that cautious and corrective judicial intervention is constitutionally mandated and 
democratically legitimate.  
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Judicious Review: the Constitutional 
Practice of the UK Supreme Court  
In modern pluralistic democracies judicial review of legislation inevitably raises normative 
questions with respect to the proper relationship between judiciary and legislature. 
Constitutional review usually operates when three conditions are met. First, where a 
constitutional document purports to constrain the enactment of laws and the exercise of 
public power. Second, where a judicial body operates independently of the legislature and the 
executive. Third, where the judiciary is authorised to adjudicate challenges to legislation as 
against the principles of the constitution.1 The United Kingdom ticks only the independent 
judiciary box.2 The first and third conditions are not met: no constraining constitution exists, 
and the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) does not have the power to adjudicate challenges to 
Parliament’s authority to enact any particular piece of legislation.  
That said, there is growing evidence that senior judges no longer view the broader 
constitutional context as purely advisory. The UKSC Justices not only resolve individual 
cases, but also interpret and implement constitutional law and principles. The cases examined 
in this article are intricate and deeply reasoned, rather than pithy applications of the doctrine 
of legislative intent. This process of constitutional interpretation resembles the function of 
constitutional review, e.g. in the USA. Domestically this process does not happen in the 
structured, top-down, way that is familiar from systems with a constitution empowering the 
judiciary to limit the public powers.3 It is a gradual process of the UKSC holding public 
                                                          
1 See generally, D. Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist: Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 6.  
2 See generally G. Gee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
3 R.A. Posner, “Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated  
Constitutional Rights” (1992) 59 University of Chicago Law Review 433-450. 
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bodies to constitutional standards and putting Parliament on alert that it could conceivably do 
the same for legislation.  
I am not claiming that the UKSC is morphing into a legislative third chamber or is 
equipping itself with legislative strike-down powers, but nor do I accept that the UKSC 
Justices understand their role as mechanically giving effect to parliamentary intention. 
Instead, the UKSC operates under the competing demands of autonomy and constraint: it is 
institutionally independent from politics, but must generate and secure its own kind of 
legitimacy through adherence to law and the constitution. Autonomy requires interpretative 
parity with Parliament over the constitution.4 Legitimacy involves complex value judgements 
in areas where law meets politics, as where individual justice clashes with public policy.  
David Robertson defines constitutional review in liberal democracies as “a mechanism 
for permeating all regulated aspects of society with a set of values inherent in the 
constitutional agreement the society has accepted”.5 This definition fits with judicial review 
in the UK at the highest level as well. This overlap in turn gives rise to the well-known clash 
between a system of independent judicial supervision of parliamentary legislation and the 
principle of electoral democracy. The literature largely dismisses the possibility of 
“exceptional circumstances review” in the context of oppressive or arbitrary legislation on the 
basis that such review lacks authority and justification in constitutional law.6  
My response is that judicial intervention in hard but non-exceptional cases, i.e. those that 
involve a clash of higher-order principles, is already a feature of the UK’s constitutional 
landscape. Since judicial review cannot be justified with reference to constitutional law, I will 
shift the focus and ask instead whether it can be justified with reference to democracy. I will 
                                                          
4 S. Sedley, “Human Rights a Twenty-First Century Agenda” [1995] Public Law 386, 389. 
5 Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist, 7. 
6 M. Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Oxford: 
Hart, 2015), 236. 
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discuss the merits and demerits of judicial review in the next section. I then fall back on 
literature to examine the role of top courts in constitutional democracies. Finally, I explain 
how a significant number of Justices utilise the creative tension between autonomy and 
constraint to assert the UKSC’s jurisdiction over hard cases and complex questions. I argue 
that the obstacles to exceptional circumstances review are gradually being eroded, that the 
UKSC is likely to assert its authority over more cases and issues in the future, and that sound 
reasons for judicial intervention meet the requirements of democratic legitimacy. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Paul W. Kahn bases the legitimacy of every legal order on two standards: a standard of 
will, according to which law is grounded in popular consent; and a standard of reason that 
corrects procedural and substantive deficiencies.7 In the USA, the question whether a judicial 
body that was not elected by and is not accountable to the public should invalidate 
majoritarian policies is polarised by camps that are broadly rights-sceptic (standard of will) 
and rights-foundational (standard of reason). On one end of the spectrum, Alexander Bickel8 
and Jeremy Waldron9 stand for a position that regards constitutional review as an illegitimate 
constraint upon the principle of political participation. It limits the equal right of citizens to 
take part in and influence the political decision-making processes that give rise to the laws 
with which they have to comply. Writing about the USA, H.L.A. Hart described judicial 
review of legislation as an “extraordinary judicial phenomenon” that is “particularly hard to 
justify in a democracy”.10 John Hart Ely saw the main issue with judicial review of legislation 
being that “a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant 
                                                          
7 P.W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), 7-8. 
8 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986). 
9 J. Waldon, “The Core Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 155(6) Yale Law Journal 1346-1360. 
10 H.L.A. Hart, “American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes” in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 125. 
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way is telling the people’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they’d like”.11 
Michael Perry reminds his readers that in a democracy electorally accountable government is 
“axiomatic”, whereas judicial review requires “justification”.12 
The other end of the spectrum, exemplified by Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, deals 
with the two institutions separately. Judicial review of legislation is legitimate in so far as it 
involves an appeal to individual rights and constitutional principle, which set out the 
parameters within which political power may be legally exercised.13 The legislature, by 
contrast, ought to make use of policy when enacting laws to advance the public good and 
society at large. On this view, the courts and Parliament are not rival institutions but, in their 
own ways, both engaged with what Rawls calls “the idea of public reason”, i.e. the idea of a 
stable constitutional democratic society.14 The role of the court is not limited to checking the 
process of legislating, but should also ensure substantive compliance with democratic 
values.15 
In the UK the absence of constitutional review greatly weakens the equivalent positions. 
One branch of the debate argues that the doctrine of ultra vires performs a democratic 
requirement in giving effect to parliamentary will. A rival branch counters that the principles 
of judicial review (illegality, irrationality, impropriety, proportionality) were created by the 
common law, developed by courts, and have little or nothing to do with parliamentary intent. 
Paul Craig encapsulates the comparatively innocuous parameters in one sentence: 
                                                          
11 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A theory of judicial review (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1980), 4-5.  
12 M. Perry, The Courts, the Constitution, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 9. 
13 R. Dworkin, “Political Judges and the Rule of Law” in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) 9, 11–12; J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
212–54. 
14 Rawls Ibid.  
15 David A. J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 14-19. 
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The essential dividing line between supporters and opponents of the ultra vires model is 
as to how far legislative intent can provide a satisfactory explanation for the norms which 
constitute judicial review.16 
These two positions are, in any case, not beyond reconciliation. The modified ultra 
vires doctrine assumes that Parliament intends to legislate in accordance with judicially-
enforceable rule of law criteria that include individual rights and principles of good 
governance.17 Judges already look for express statutory words to empower a public body to 
act contrary to fundamental principles.18 Independent courts are needed, on this view, to 
protect individuals and minorities from the will of the majority.19 
Of course there is more to these domestic debates. The point is that most political 
constitutionalists do not decry judicial review as “illegitimate” or regard it as a “deviant 
institution”20 and most legal constitutionalists do not advocate for the “rule of law courts” or 
judicial supremacy. The arguments for and against judicial review are made within the 
constitutional framework, and not in opposition to it. Alison Young considers the literature 
on legal and political constitutionalism in greater detail. She concludes that for the most part 
the differences are a matter of degree, not kind. There is significant overlap between the rival 
camps regarding human rights protection and the need for judicial review, and they end up 
favouring either legal or political controls. On the question posed at the outset, whether an 
account of the judicial role can be given that is consistent with the principle of majoritarian 
                                                          
16 P.P. Craig, Competing Models of Judicial Review, in C. Forsyth (eds) Judicial Review and the Constitution 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 392. 
17 M. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart, 2001), ch.4. 
18 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms and O’Brien [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 A.C. 
115, per Lord Steyn at p.130 and per Lord Hoffmann at p.131  
19 S. Sedley, “The Common Law and the Constitution” in M.P. Nolan and S. Sedley (eds) The Making and 
Remaking of the British Constitution (London: Blackstone Press, 1997), 25. See also A and X v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (Belmarsh detainees) [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68, per Lady Hale at 
[237]; R. (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52; [2008] 1 A.C. 719, per Lord Brown at 
[158]; R. (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23; [2001] 2 All E.R. 929, per 
Lord Hoffmann at [70]. 
20 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 18.  
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government, Young finds “no conclusive proof for any argument” and suggests that the 
supposed rivalry amounts to little more than a labelling exercise.21 Adam Tomkins also 
accepts the validity of both positions: it is undemocratic for unelected and unrepresentative 
judges to rule over constitutional questions, but judicial intervention is also an essential 
corrective against democratic pathologies, e.g. a temptation by the majority to violate 
minority rights.22 
One recurring theme, however, is the conception of courts in opposition to the 
legislature. Their differences are obvious. Parliament is the proper institution to enact 
generally-applicable legislation on the basis of public consultation and deliberation. Courts 
are the proper forum for resolving disputes between private litigants. Whereas legislation 
applies prospectively and determines the future direction of society, judicial decisions apply 
retroactively to events that occurred in the past.23  
However, it does not follow that all legislation is presumptively democratic, or that a 
judicial decision that rivals statutory law is undemocratic on the grounds that judges are 
unelected. This oppositional stance results in a zero-sum game in which “courts are always 
cast as the villain in the democratic piece”.24 The connection between the court’s unelected 
composition and the illegitimacy of constitutional review is taken for granted when it is 
precisely that connection that has to be challenged in order to ascertain whether the courts’ 
review function is indispensable in a constitutional democracy. 
                                                          
21 A. L. Young, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 66.  
22 A. Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 210.  
23 J. Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 9-10.  
24 A.C. Hutchinson, “The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts” in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.) Recrafting the 
Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford: Hart, 1999), 202.  
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The two institutions also have more in common than is commonly assumed. First, like 
legislatures, courts enjoy status and power.25 Unlike legislatures, judicial decisions do not 
have to follow political imperatives or public opinion. Instead, ‘…courts have certain 
capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not 
posses’.26 This is of particular value as regards causes on which the legislature, for political 
reasons, may never decide to act.27 Second, like the elected political branches, courts also 
claim to represent the people.28 Courts are not ‘representative’ in the same way that an MP is 
an envoi of the electorate in his or her constituency. The courts are rather ‘representational’ in 
that they represent the public interest or common good. As Bickel notes, courts articulate 
principles that are capable of obtaining popular consent.29 Finally, like legislatures, courts 
require legitimacy. Unlike legislatures, courts do not derive their legitimacy from a simple 
conception of democracy, i.e. the aggregation of majority preferences. Instead, judicial 
legitimacy stems from a complex constellation that comprises professional expertise, 
institutional autonomy, and an enduring concern with Rawls’ idea of public reason. To 
summarise my argument, the democratic legitimacy of judicial review depends on 
constitutional principle as a normative reference point, on the courts as representational 
organs, and on the law as ‘a continuous, historical process in which the law is developing 
through constant efforts of reform’.30 These themes will be explored in the next section. For 
all their differences, courts and legislatures 
…are in the same game, namely fashioning and implementing a notion of democracy 
that can provide practical answers to the challenges that presently confront society. 
                                                          
25 Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions, 270. 
26 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 25. 
27 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38; [2015] 1 A.C. 657 at [300], per Lady Hale.  
28 Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law, 78. 
29 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 239. 
30 Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law, 15, emphasis added.  
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And, in doing that, neither courts nor legislatures have a lock on political judgement 
about what it is best to do.31 
Accepting the democratic legitimacy and indispensability of both institutions allows 
us to inquire into the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation. What is the proper role of 
the judiciary in the UK constitution? How can judges secure the independence of their 
institutions and the autonomy of their decisions? Finally, how can judges respect the principle 
of democracy and provide for “the evolution and application of society’s fundamental 
principles”?32  
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
Martin Shapiro notes critically how the judicial function to give effect to the will of 
Parliament operates against the courts. If legislative supremacy is the overriding 
constitutional axiom the courts cannot effectively limit government action except in so far as 
the outcome of judicial review proceedings enforce and enshrine legislative intent: ‘whatever 
judicial independence might mean in the English context, it certainly could not mean political 
independence’.33 But appearances can be deceptive, and the existence of the common law 
renders the relationship between Parliament and the courts more complex than the formal 
description suggests. As guardians of the common law, courts have developed principles, 
such as fairness, reason, accountability, fundamental rights, and equality of treatment, which 
are presumed not to be undermined by Parliament when it legislates (save for express terms 
to the contrary). But judges not only resolve disputes, they also interpret the law, which in the 
                                                          
31 Hutchinson, “The Rule of Law Revisited”, 218-9. 
32 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 109. 
33 M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 66.  
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context of appeals courts involves some measure of developing norms. ‘If judges make law’ 
Shapiro concludes, ‘then judicial independence is a very problematic value in a democracy’.34 
The previous section shows how the examination of judicial review in a constitution that is 
structurally imbalanced by the existence of two rules of recognition (parliamentary 
sovereignty and the common law) involves ‘paradox, conflict, ambiguity, and unresolved 
tensions’.35 This deadlock needs to be broken. The question in this section is whether 
analysing judicial independence on the presumption of democratic legitimacy generates 
different themes. The scholars I have selected broadly contribute to “judicial institution 
building”, which Crow understands as “the creation, consolidation, expansion, or reduction of 
the structural and institutional capacities needed to respond to and intervene in the political 
environment”.36 The emerging themes outline a finely balanced justification of judicial 
review that protects democracy’s structural conditions, respects the UKSC’s institutional 
capacities, recognises a need for cautious and corrective intervention, and that is rooted in a 
deep concern for democratic legitimacy. 
 
Judicial Review and Democracy’s Structural Conditions 
The first justification for judicial review lies in protecting democracy’s structural conditions, 
which contradicts Bickel’s claim that judicial review is essentially undemocratic. It also goes 
against Ely’s primary concern with preserving the integrity of majoritarian legislative 
procedures. Electoral legitimacy, which stresses the equal rights of political participation of 
                                                          
34 M. Shapiro, “Judicial Independence: New Challenges in Established Nations” (2013) 20(1) Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 253-277, 257.  
35 Shapiro, Courts, 66.  
36 J. Crow, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development (Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 8.  
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citizens and majoritarian decision-making, is clearly the base line. However, a decision does 
not become right because a group of persons reaches it by simple or special majority rules.  
Samuel Freeman, a legal philosopher, does not assume that the links between judicial 
review and democracy exist.37 From the outset, Freeman constructs a conception of 
democracy as a form of sovereignty rather than as a form of government. The form of 
government is based on a procedural understanding of democracy that is defined by the basic 
requirements of universal franchise, free and fair elections, equal representation, and majority 
rule.38 It is a standard of will. By contrast, the form of sovereignty assumes the existence of 
“structural requirements” and the “background conditions” of stable democracies, as well as 
the “normative requirements of the values and ideals” that underpin democratic institutions.39 
It is a standard of reason. Form and procedure represent necessary but insufficient conditions 
for legitimate law-making: democracy’s structural requirements must also be satisfied. These 
stem from the recognition of civil and political rights that support the equal freedom and 
independence of citizens. In particular, Freeman mentions “whatever rights are necessary for 
free and informed political deliberation and public discussion”, such as freedoms of speech 
and association.40 Utilising the social contract theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John 
Rawls, Freeman identifies rights and procedures as democratic if they “promote the good of 
each citizen and maintain the equal rights that constitute their democratic sovereignty”.41 
Democracy, in short, is a form of sovereignty that is justified by a social contract of the 
people.  
                                                          
37 S. Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review” (1990-1991) 9 Law and 
Philosophy 327-370, 328.  
38 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 337. 
39 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 336. 
40 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 350. 
41 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 350. 
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The constitutional system generates its own procedures for determining the legality of 
political decisions. However, these must be complemented by independent criteria for 
assessing the legitimacy of those decisions, which are provided by the democratic system. 
The constitution of a democratic society straddles a procedural concern for legality and the 
formal equality of individuals, and a substantive concern for legitimacy according to which 
people determine and pursue their own conception of a good life in accordance with general 
social rules. Democracy allows people to rule themselves in Rawlsian fashion by enacting 
laws on the basis of principles that everyone can accept.  
In light of the above, Freeman welcomes judicial review of legislation as a pre-
commitment of free, equal, and rational citizens, under which “citizens provide themselves 
with a means for protecting their sovereignty and independence from the unreasonable 
exercise of their political rights in legislative processes”.42 Taking democracy’s infrastructure 
“off the legislative itinerary” is not undemocratic: judicial review of legislation only limits 
“ordinary legislative power in the interest of protecting the equal rights of democratic 
sovereignty”.43 After all, if democracy emphasised only equal political rights and rule by 
majority there would be no incentive to obey the law. Without constraints, majoritarianism 
threatens the idea of a legal system. Courts may be imperfect institutions, but they provide 
citizens with a “means for protecting their sovereignty and independence from the 
unreasonable exercise of their political rights in legislative processes”.44 In conclusion, 
Freeman highlights in what circumstances democratic judicial review can be distinguished 
from undemocratic judicial review.  
                                                          
42 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 353. 
43 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 353. 
44 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 353. 
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There is nothing undemocratic…about the judicial review of laws that infringe against 
the equality of such fundamental moral rights as liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought, freedom of association, freedom of occupation and choice of careers, 
political participation, and more generally, the freedom to pursue one’s own plan of 
life. Judicial review is undemocratic when it contravenes majority decisions in order 
to maintain the power and legal privileges of elite social and economic classes against 
social change and economic reforms designed to enable each citizen to achieve 
independence and to effectively exercise these fundamental rights.45 
These are the choices: either the absence of electoral accountability or political will is 
equated with the absence of democratic legitimacy, or judicial review on the basis of legal 
principles is one of the choices made by pre-committed, free, and equal citizens to protect 
their sovereignty and independence. Either democratic theory is merely about establishing the 
rights and principles according to which citizens wish to be governed, or it also includes 
constitutional mechanisms for their protection. For Freeman, courts are the appropriate 
institution, and judicial review a sensible mechanism, to uphold democracy’s structural 
conditions.  
Judicial Review and Representation 
The second justification for judicial review is representational, which has an experiential and 
a constructive component. The experiential aspect demands some form of social acceptance. 
On the one hand, the complete absence of social acceptance would be fatal for any public 
institution: “[n]o institution can survive the loss of public confidence, particularly when the 
people’s faith is its only support”.46 On the other hand, courts should not be pressured into 
                                                          
45 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy”, 367-68. 
46 D. Alfange, The Supreme Court and the National Will (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Doubleday, 1937) 235. 
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securing mainstream public opinion or “specific support” for individual cases. Public 
disagreement with a judicial decision does not equate to withdrawing support for the 
judiciary as an institution. As representational organs, then, courts depend on “diffuse 
support”, i.e. broadly favourable public attitudes even when the public disagrees with the 
outcome of a specific case.47 However, the more important task lies in the construction of 
courts and judicial review as ‘representation of the people’.48 
The central point underpinning Kahn and Freeman is that democratic government 
combines will and procedure with reason and structure. Christopher L. Eisgruber, a 
constitutional scholar, embraces the dualism by refuting the received wisdom that only 
elected legislatures are qualified to make decisions on behalf of the people. Eisgruber 
refashions the judiciary (and the US Supreme Court in particular) as “a sophisticated kind of 
representative institution”.49 Judicial review ought not to be conceived negatively as a 
constraint, but positively “as one institutional mechanism for implementing a complex, non-
majoritarian understanding of democracy”.50 Elected and majoritarian institutions do not 
accurately represent the people: neither the majority nor the electorate can sensibly be 
equated with the people. It follows that elected bodies need to be supplemented by other 
types of institutions, such as independent agencies, central banks, and constitutional courts.51 
Like Dworkin, Eisgruber regards judicial review as an “ingredient” of a modern legal 
system, and not as an external constraint.52 In Law’s Empire, Dworkin breaks judicial 
                                                          
47 See generally G. A. Caldeira and J.L. Gibson, “The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court” (1992) 
36 American Journal of Political Science 635-664. 
48 R. Alexy, “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation” (2005) 3(4) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 572-581, 578. 
49 C.L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 48. 
50 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government 48. 
51 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government 52. 
52 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government 77.  
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decision-making down into three stages.53 The pre-interpretative stage identifies the 
preliminary rules and standards that relate to a certain social practice. At the interpretative 
stage the judge formulates a narrative of the main elements of that practice and assesses 
whether the general shape of that practice is worth pursuing. During the post-interpretative 
stage the judge considers the stage two justifications, and decides the case on the basis of 
what the prevailing social practice requires. Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, which forms a 
branch of his theory of integrity, rests on the articulation of principles or values that are 
fundamental to the constitution and underpin the legal rules. In other words, Dworkin regards 
judicial review as a necessary ingredient of a constitutionalised legal system.  
Dworkin envisions a constitutional role for judges, who are guided by conceptions of 
justice based on fundamental rights and principles. But what about a distinctly democratic 
role for judges? Whereas Ely understands judicial review as merely “representation-
reinforcing”,54 scholars like Robert Alexy and Eisgruber refer to judges as “representatives of 
the people”. Judges are said to represent the common interest or general will of the people. 
The legislature represent the people through elections, votes, and reflecting transient public 
opinion, the judiciary by developing and protecting a timeless account of justice.55 This can 
only be achieved if the judges’ reasons are grounded in ex ante principles or structural 
conditions that “are at some greater level of generality and at some temporal remove from the 
statutes that judges are called on to apply”.56  
How convincing is the argument that elitist and unelected judges have a better idea of the 
people’s sense of justice than elected representatives? Jeb Rubenfeld takes up the 
                                                          
53 R.M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986), 65-68. 
54 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Discontent, 87. 
55 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government 78; see also 7, 52, 126; Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law 80. 
56 K.L. Scheppele, “Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political Pressure” in S.B. Burbank and 
B. Friedman (eds) Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Sage Publications, 
2002), 227, 245. 
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implications of Eisgruber’s thesis. Rubenfeld plays with the idea of a federal statute 
establishing Christianity as the national religion in the USA, which would clearly violate the 
US Constitution irrespective of popular support. Should the US Supreme Court judges 
enforce the historical commitments to justice and liberty? Or might they find that the statute 
accurately reflects the moral judgement of contemporary society and deem it to be 
constitutional?57 The problem with Eisgruber’s thesis lies in the imprecision with which he 
describes judges as making decisions “on the basis of a conception of justice with which 
Americans in general could plausibly identify themselves”.58 Rubenfeld spots this weakness 
immediately and, taking Eisgruber at his word, undercuts the “judges-as-spokesmen-for-the-
people” position59 through simple hypotheticals.  
Yet Rubenfeld’s criticism goes too far. It is correct that judges ought to make decisions 
on the basis of legal reasoning and their legal knowledge, experience, and understanding, and 
without being subject to external political pressures. Yet the manner in which courts represent 
the people is “purely argumentative”.60 Asking judges to try to identify and express the 
principles and values of contemporary society is not, pace Rubenfeld, the same as 
government by judicial proxy. Arguably their reputation as fair decision-makers is at stake 
not when they become embroiled in hard cases involving clashes of principles, but when they 
publish their opinion: “[t]he real controversy today is about which morally and politically 
contested issues judges should address, not about whether they should address such issues at 
all”.61 By concerning themselves with the public interest and the common good the courts as 
representational organs supplement the role of political and representative institutions. 
                                                          
57 J. Rubenfeld, “Of Constitutional Self-Government” (2003) 1555 Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 1749-1765, 
1751-1752. 
58 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government, 126. 
59 Rubenfeld, “Of Constitutional Self-Government”, 1754. 
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Improving public discussion by framing political issues in terms of reasons and principle, and 
not influence and will, contributes a further democratic justification for judicial review. 
Judicial Review and Time 
The third justification for judicial review adds a diachronic element to democracy’s structural 
conditions and the court’s representational function. The French modern political historian 
Pierre Rosanvallon reaffirms Kahn and Freeman by demanding and generating novel types of 
legitimacy to add to the traditional forms based on electoral representation. Democracy has 
become “decentred”62 since the collapse of the dual forms of electoral legitimacy (universal 
suffrage) and bureaucratic legitimacy (public administration) in the Western world since the 
early 1980s.63 The old democratic order is complemented by a new representative order based 
on independent authorities and novel processes.64 Elections still matter, but whereas 
previously legitimacy derived from the intrinsic attributes of the relevant institutions (the 
ballot box and a competitive selection process for civil servants), the new forms of legitimacy 
are defined by qualities that “are never definitively acquired. They remain precarious, always 
open to challenge, and dependent on social perceptions of institutional actions and 
behaviour”.65 
Rosanvallon tracks Eisgruber by focussing on those institutions that are not usually 
regarded as democratically legitimate, such as constitutional courts and regulatory agencies. 
Constitutional courts are caught in the binary trap between reason and will, law and 
democracy, between constitutional supervision and the majoritarian principle, which in the 
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UK translates into the respective doctrines of the rule of law and ultra vires. Rosanvallon 
instead seeks to connect independent authorities to his conception of pluralist democracy. He 
does this in two ways. First, by treating the adversarial form of electoral-representative 
competition for votes (a “realm of partisan politics”) and the more consensual form of 
decision-making based on the general interest (a “realm of common existence”) as two sides 
of the same coin.66 Second, by supplementing electoral-representative legitimacy with new 
modes of democratic legitimacy: impartiality, reflexivity, and proximity. Impartiality allows 
independent institutions without electoral authority, but with administrative expertise, to 
monitor or regulate the activities of others. Reflexivity allows constitutional courts, for 
instance, to hold the lawmaker to account and, if need be, “to compensate for the failure of 
electoral majorities to embody the general will”.67 Proximity results from an ideal of 
government that concerns itself with “everyone’s problems”. Proximity is not associated with 
any particular institution, but emerges from “a range of social expectations as to the 
behaviour of those who govern”.68  
Rosanvallon follows in the footsteps of Marquis de Condorcet, who rendered 
“representative democracy” more complex than many of his post-revolutionary 
contemporaries had thought. For Condorcet, the people could only exist politically through 
representation, which expressed itself in multiple ways. The short term could be addressed 
with referendums and through censure; the periodic through institutionalised elections; and 
the long term through constitution. Rosanvallon adds to the complexity of the concept of 
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democratic legitimacy by mirroring Condorcet’s manifestations of the people, which oscillate 
between “the people of the ballot box and the people as principle”.69  
The abstraction of the people to an axiomatic principle that is constituted by equality 
and held together by fundamental rights and citizenship70 resonates with the representational 
function discussed in the previous section. It bears on the democratic legitimacy of 
constitutional courts in three ways. First, the modern democratic polity sustains a complex 
tension between institutions of conflict, such as legislatures, and institutions of consensus,71 
such as courts. Consensus does not mean that judges always agree, but refers to the source of 
judicial legitimacy, namely the courts’ “constituent impartiality”72 towards the people as 
principle. Courts represent the people socially and politically,73 which allows individuals and 
groups to challenge a government decision if, in Pettit’s words, the decision is unsupported 
by “public reasons recognised in the community and should therefore be amended or 
rejected”.74 Judicial review necessarily brings representation clashes to the fore: the 
government speaks for the majority or popular opinion (political will), the courts stand for the 
permanent interest of the people (constitutional principle).75 Rosavallon stresses that “[a]ny 
regime based on universal suffrage suffers from the fundamental flaw of mistaking the 
majority for the whole, and it is the job of the courts to stand as a constant reminder of 
this.”76 
Second, Rosanvallon links the courts’ representational function to time. Courts are not 
just adjudicators in individual cases but, by developing rights and principles, participants in 
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democratic deliberation. As norm-developing institutions, courts “reconstruct the history of 
the law”77 and gradually produce a “collective memory”.78 For Kahn, judicial opinions are a 
special form of legal self-justification. “They are designed to be read in an indefinite future, 
with the expectation that they will invoke in the reader a continuing loyalty to the rule of 
law”.79 This is echoed by Rosanvallon, for whom courts fulfil two related functions. they are 
“the guarantors of the promises that community makes to itself”; and “they preserve the 
identity of democracy over time”.80 
Third, Rosanvallon ties the axiom of the people to stable constitutional principles. The 
formal component of law-making, parliamentary government, produces only ordinary (short-
term) politics. Democracies are intrinsically biased in favour of the present,81 meaning that 
short-termism is a necessary condition of the political system rather than the failing of 
individual politicians. To counteract the constant perils of short-termism, which viewed from 
the future appears as “the dead hand of the past”,82 Rosanvallon underlines the need for 
timeless constitutional principles. Decisions need to be made on the basis of norms and 
principles, which in turn generate their own social acceptance and legitimacy.  
Rosanvallon overcomes the tired binary trade-offs of conventional constitutional 
theory. Constitutionalism is not the opposite of democracy, but its necessary condition. 
Courts and elected institutions do not operate antagonistically, but as components of a unified 
framework.83 Judicial review and parliamentary decision-making are “complementary 
procedures for expressing the general will”: one has immediate effect, the other operates 
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reflexively and across time.84 Decisions by the top court are not the expression of a 
contextual constitutional interpretation, but normatively stable and valid for the long-term. 
But how can a court produce normative stability and ensure long duration?  
Here Rosanvallon relies on an idiosyncratic and decontextualized understanding of 
law. Decisions by the top court remove normative claims from their point of origin and 
political interests. They become ahistorical, apolitical, and acontextual. This portrayal of 
courts as “outside politics” reflects a Continental understanding that does not accurately 
describe common law institutions. According to Max Weber, in a bureaucratic state with 
rational laws,  
…the judge is a kind of legal paragraph-machine into which one throws the 
documents on a case together with the costs and fees so that it will then spit out a 
judgement along with some more or less valid reasons for it […].85 
By contrast, in England, Weber continues, the shaping of law is a practical process that casts 
the judge as a less mechanical but still rule-bound political actor. Normative stability in the 
common law is generated by judges who are bound by precedent. The doctrine of precedent 
connects the past to the present and the future. Principles become timeless due to their 
systemic connection and continuity. On the one hand, the practice ensures certainty and 
predictability, or in Weber’s phrase “calculable schemata”.86 On the other hand, it still 
provides some room for manoeuvre. Judges “…work the past so as to realise its present 
possibilities for future innovation”.87  
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UKSC 
In the final section I want to show that the UKSC is increasingly committed to the three 
reference points (structural conditions, axiomatic representation, and historical process) that 
were outlined in the previous section. The UKSC has approached a number of recent cases 
with reference to ex ante principles, such as the rule of law and the separation of powers, 
rather than solely on the basis of legislative intent. This is not a case of Justices simply 
articulating their personal preferences into law – a near-impossible proposition within the 
context of a judicial institution.88 Rather, constitutional law compels them to speak in an 
idiom that embraces rights and principles as “inherent and fundamental to democratic 
civilised society”.89 Additionally they draw on time to articulate legal history and collective 
memory: “We are not making it up as we go along, but building upon the centuries of law 
and jurisprudence which make up our national narrative”.90 Higher-order principles and an 
account of justice across time are incorporated into judicial reasoning, which fosters a rich, 
multifaceted, and non-majoritarian understanding of democracy. It also contributes to an 
axiomatic form of judicial representation of the public good.  
Lord Steyn’s judgment in Jackson91 stands out as the high watermark of a shift in 
judicial approaches from deferential adherence to sovereignty to a recognition of free-
standing constitutional principles.92 The Attorney General had intimated that a government 
could combine its majority in the House of Commons with the Parliament Act 1949 to 
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introduce “oppressive and wholly undemocratic legislation”, e.g. to abolish the House of 
Lords (the legislative chamber) or judicial review.93 Although Lord Steyn acknowledges this 
position as technically correct he goes on to ponder the existence of a “constitutional 
fundamental”, such as judicial review, “which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the 
behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish”.94 This sentiment resonates with 
Lord Hope, who stresses the rule of law as “the ultimate controlling factor” of the British 
constitution,95 and Lady Hale, who imagines that a court would “treat with particular 
suspicion (and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law”.96 This was an 
unprecedented judicial shot across Parliament’s bow as part of a judgement. Lord Hope re-
issues the warning in Axa when he counsels the government against abolishing judicial 
review or individual rights: “the rule of law requires that the judges must retain the power to 
insist that legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will recognise”.97  
Jackson and Axa do not establish a springboard for judicial intervention that utilises 
the rule of law to strike down oppressive parliamentary legislation.98 They merely suggest 
that some senior judges acknowledge the need for corrective judicial intervention in truly 
exceptional and altogether undemocratic circumstances. I do not use this article to speculate 
about what additional circumstances might qualify. Instead, I examine three cases post-
Jackson/Axa to show that some judges are successfully expanding the UKSC’s constitutional 
case law by testing legislative authority in hard but non-exceptional cases. The doctrine of 
legislative intent no longer goes unchallenged by the UKSC; the objections to judicial review 
                                                          
93 Jackson, per Lord Steyn at [101-102]. 
94 Jackson at [102]. 
95 Jackson at [107]. 
96 Jackson at [159]. 
97 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 A.C. 868, Lord Hope at [51] 
and Lord Reed at [149]. The comments were made in the context of Acts of the Scottish Parliament, but were 
sufficiently abstract to apply to the Westminster Parliament as well.  
98 T.R.S. Allan, “Questions of Legality and Legitimacy: Form and substance in British constitutionalism” (2011) 
9(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 155–162. 
23 
 
are being systematically addressed and dismantled; the simplicity of the position that strike-
down powers are unconstitutional is countered with a more complex set of factors that 
renders cautious and corrective intervention, or judicious review, legitimate in a 
constitutional democracy such as the UK.  
The first case to consider in more detail is ex p Evans.99 The case pits the Upper 
Tribunal’s order to disclose Prince Charles’ memos to government ministers against the 
Attorney General’s statutory power100 to block disclosure on “reasonable grounds”. A seven-
member UKSC addresses a delicate separation of powers argument, namely whether the 
Freedom of Information Act permitted a government minister (the Attorney General) to 
override a judicial decision. Evans reveals deep disagreement over whether to defer to the 
ostensible will of Parliament, or to uphold the rule of law and subject an executive decision to 
judicial review. 
In a bold move, Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Kerr and Lord Reed concurred) 
denies that the Attorney General held a veto power. His reasoning would not appear out of 
place in a court with constitutional review powers. For Lord Neuberger, the rule of law 
qualifies as a structural requirement in the sense that Freeman articulates. From this premise, 
and reasoning from the top-down, it follows that a judicial decision must bind all the parties 
to it, including the executive, and that a government decision is generally reviewable by a 
court of law at the suit of an affected citizen.101 Lord Neuberger also sets much store by the 
fact that the disclosure order had been issued by a tribunal whose legitimacy reflects 
Rosanvallon’s values of impartiality, reflexivity, and proximity: i) its decisions are subject to 
appeal; ii) it had particular relevant expertise and experience; iii) it had conducted a full 
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hearing with witnesses; iv) it was a public tribunal which heard full adversarial argument; v) 
the decision of the tribunal was closely reasoned.102  
By contrast, the dissenting opinions of Lord Hughes and Lord Wilson, which defer to 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, appear timid and unconvincing.103 Lord Hughes 
agrees with the proposition that Parliament would not ordinarily empower a government 
minister to override a judicial decision, but goes on to state that “Parliament has plainly 
shown such an intention in the present instance”.104 Acknowledging the central importance of 
the rule of law, Lord Hughes concludes that “it is an integral part of the rule of law that courts 
give effect to Parliamentary intention”. Lord Wilson, similarly, bases his dissent on “the most 
precious” constitutional principle of “parliamentary sovereignty, emblematic of our 
democracy”.105 However, this position is flawed for authorising a member of the executive to 
veto a decision by a court or tribunal.  
The disagreement falls neatly within the framework provided by will and reason, or 
ultra vires and the rule of law. One side of the argument is typified by judges who defer to the 
plain meaning of the statute in combination with executive discretion at the behest of 
Parliament. The other side is characterised by judges who seek to uphold the principle of 
legality, who resist the plain meaning approach, and who insist that ministerial discretion be 
controlled by reason and deliberation.106 
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Beyond those constitutional confines, the case stands out for Lord Neuberger’s 
judgement, which represents a new judicial attitude that solidifies the constitutional 
autonomy of the UKSC. First, Lord Neuberger defies the government by upholding rule of 
law principles that qualify as structural requirements that underpin stable democratic 
institutions. These are procedural restraints that citizens would rationally accept in order to 
safeguard the background conditions of their democratic sovereignty. A court can only 
protect the political rights of individuals from arbitrary interference by the executive if the 
decision by a court is “final and binding”107 and not subject to executive override. Second, 
Lord Neuberger bases his judgement on judicial authority dating back to 1841.108 In 
Rosanvallon’s phraseology, Lord Neuberger’s reconstruction of legal history dating back to 
the mid-nineteenth century evokes the common law as collective memory. Similar to a 
constitutional court, the UKSC emerges as “dialogical partner” and “public reasoner” that 
challenges the political branches to engage with its reasons and arguments based on certain 
community promises that have stood the test of time.109 The crucial difference is that it does 
not have the final say on the substance. In its response to Evans, the Independent 
Commission on Freedom of Information did not attack the UKSC’s decision, but 
recommended that “the government should legislate to put beyond doubt that it has the power 
to exercise a veto over the release of information under the Act”.110 For present purposes, the 
normative concern (the validity of judicial decisions) coupled with the structural condition 
(rule of law), the institutional condition (impartiality and independence), and the temporal 
condition (precedent) justify to legitimise the exercise of judicial review.  
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Tenuous in Evans, the timeless quality of principles of justice is clearer in the seven-
member decision by the UKSC in Unison.111 In this case, employment tribunal fees 
introduced by the Lord Chancellor using delegated legislation were deemed unlawful. The 
UKSC distinguishes the principle of imposing fees on the basis of primary legislation from 
the effect of the fees imposed, which was to render unaffordable a person’s right to access 
courts and tribunals. Lord Reed, who delivered the unanimous judgement, approaches the 
case by linking the Lord Chancellor’s power to impose fees to “constitutional principles 
which underlie the text”, the most important one being the constitutional right of access to 
justice.112 Access to courts is inherent in the rule of law – although this is, as Lord Reed 
caustically points out, “not always understood” by the government.113 A common 
misconception is that courts and tribunals provide a service that is of benefit only to the 
“users” who appear before them and who should, therefore, pay to use the service, rather than 
to society as a whole. Speaking to that mistaken belief, Lord Reed delivers an object lesson 
on the rule of law and on the relationship between Parliament and the courts. In particular, he 
stresses that without the right of access to the courts 
…laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be 
rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may 
become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public 
service like any other.114 
Lord Reed’s reasoning connects to structural requirements, to enduring principles, and 
to the court as a representational body (“public service”). Decisions like Donoghue v 
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Stevenson115 are not simply of value to the individual bringing the claim, but also to the 
common law for clarifying or establishing legal principles of general importance:116 “[e]very 
day in the courts and tribunals of this country, the names of people who brought cases in the 
past live on as shorthand for the legal rules and principles which their cases established”.117 
Lord Reed then cites historical documents, such as ch.40 of Magna Carta 1215118 and 
passages from Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes and Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the right of court access.119 He also relies on judicial precedent from the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. 
on cases decided on common law grounds prior to the passing of the Human Rights Act 
1998. Lord Reed thereby reconstructs common law history and collective memory in the 
manner suggested by Rosanvallon. It is a deliberate move to address the legality of court fees 
“under English law”.120 (Lord Reed has form in privileging the common law over the 
ECHR121 or EU law122 – cases, which according to one commentator, mark a turn to 
“autochthonous constitutionalism”).123 
It is important to note that the enabling primary legislation in Unison “contains no 
words authorising the prevention of [judicial] access”. In the absence of clear and express 
statutory authorisation, the UKSC unanimously deems the delegated legislation ultra vires on 
the grounds that it effectively prevents individuals from having access to justice.124 As with 
the recommendation by the Independent Commission on Freedom of Information after Evans, 
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the real test would be if Parliament re-enacted the tribunal fees as an Act of Parliament. 
Would the UKSC so confidently employ its constitutional arsenal to defy Parliament’s 
arrogation of power? On the one hand, Lord Reed invokes ex p Leech125 and Daly126 to claim 
somewhat cryptically that even statutory authorisation to curtail access to courts would be 
subject to implied common law constraints.127 On the other hand, Magna Carta and the 
common law notwithstanding, such a move would be interpreted as an unprecedented and 
insubordinate rejection of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.128  
To summarise, the UKSC turns the respective appeals in Evans and Unison into 
constitutional argument. Evans concerns the legality of an executive decision by the Attorney 
General, whilst Unison involves an executive order by the Lord Chancellor. The UKSC could 
have decided both cases by using the traditional “bottom-up” methods and vocabulary of 
administrative law. Instead, the court steps into the breach with the modus operandi of a 
constitutional court. As in HS2,129 the UKSC alludes to background constitutional questions 
not in order to resolve them, but because they are “too important to pass without mention”.130 
Both judgements are landmark rulings for resting upon structural requirements (access to 
justice, judicial review, and the rule of law), and drawing on a timeless account of justice 
from Magna Charta to “the names of people who brought cases in the past” and who are 
immortalised in legal rules and principles. By asserting that courts provide a special “public 
service” that is of “value to society” as whole,131 and citing support for that claim dating back 
to 1215, Lord Reed also makes out the unspoken representational function of courts. 
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The final case exposes a lack of institutional confidence when pushed to the brink by 
primary legislation. Nicklinson132 provides evidence for claims made by all three scholars 
discussed in this article, but also contains a contemporary restatement of the case against 
judicial review. Tony Nicklinson had been the victim of a stroke that had completely 
paralysed him. He was able to communicate by moving his head and eyes. To avoid self-
starvation, which is long, painful, and distressing, his preferred way of dying lay in receiving 
a lethal drug. The injection would either be administered by another person or by a digital 
eye-blink machine that had been invented by an Australian doctor.  
The judicial review proceedings dealt with the compatibility of domestic law relating 
to assisted suicide with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although the 
Suicide Act 1961 decriminalised suicide, it retained, under s.2, the crime of assisting suicide. 
Mr Nicklinson applied to the High Court for (i) a declaration that it would be lawful for a 
doctor to kill him or to assist him in terminating his life, or, if that was refused, (ii) a 
declaration that the current state of the law in that connection was incompatible with his right 
to a private life under Art.8 ECHR. When the High Court refused to grant the declarations, 
Mr Nicklinson refused all food and medical treatment, and subsequently died of pneumonia.  
Nine Justices heard the appeal in the Supreme Court. The full range of attitudes 
within the UKSC towards judicial activism was on display. Five “interventionist” Justices 
(Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson) held that the UKSC 
in principle had the authority to issue a declaration under s.4 HRA that s.2 of the Suicide Act 
1961 was incompatible with Art.8 ECHR.133 Of those five judges, three deemed the absolute 
ban on assisted suicide to be proportionate due to the absence of “a physically and 
administratively feasible and robust system” that facilitated assisted suicide, and due to a 
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general concern for the protection of the weak and vulnerable.134 They found that the time 
was not right for a s.4 declaration, but suggested that the door remained open for a future and 
successful application.135 Only Lady Hale and Lord Kerr would have issued the declaration 
on the grounds that the universal ban on assisted suicide breached Art.8 ECHR (private and 
family life).136 The four “reserved” Justices (Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed and 
Lord Hughes) opted to defer to Parliament on the question of compatibility.  
The UKSC was aware that its decision hinged on two of the central and controversial 
questions in UK constitutional law today. First, should the UKSC create, recognise, and give 
effect to a new right to a dignified death by regulating assisted suicide? Second, are 
judgements about assisted dying more suitable for Parliament as the elected and 
representative organ of the constitution, the domestic courts, or the European Court of 
Human Rights?137 The UKSC denied the creation of a right to die and lay the matter at 
Parliament’s door.138 The ratio decidendi was attacked from several quarters as “a new threat 
to the effective protection of human rights within a domestic context”.139 However, the 
court’s ratio does not capture the extraordinary range of judicial reasoning relied on in this 
case.  
Lord Sumption resolutely upholds parliamentary process as “a better way” of 
resolving controversial questions in the context of moral and social predicaments.140 Since 
any change to the absolute prohibition on assisted suicide would place vulnerable people at 
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139 Wicks, “The Supreme Court Judgment in Nicklinson”, 155; See also R. English, ‘”No precedent? Then set 
one!” – Nicklinson right to die case’, UK Human Rights Blog, 20 August 2012. 
140 Nicklinson at [232] 
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risk, this case was “a classic example of the kind of issue which should be decided by 
Parliament”.141 Courts are conceived narrowly as law-applying and conflict-resolving 
institutions: “the legislative function is committed to Parliament and courts must not usurp 
it”.142  
As an aside, Lord Sumption’s position was unsurprising and had already been set out 
in an extracurial public lecture,143 in which he explored the question how far judicial review 
should go before it trespassed on the proper function of government and the legislature in a 
democracy. Sumption seeks bright lines between judicial review on the one hand, and the 
business of government and law-making on the other. He adopts a Bickelian account of 
procedural or electoral democracy that allows him to criticise minimally-legitimate courts for 
breaching those boundaries by making policy decisions based on merit that ought to be the 
preserve of Parliament and politically accountable ministers.144 Sumption concedes that there 
needs to be some sort of supervision of individual rights, which he views as “claims against 
the claimant’s own community”.145 But he regards parliamentary scrutiny as “generally 
perfectly adequate” in the area of policy-making. By contrast, judicial review of political 
questions “has no legitimate basis in public consent, because judges are quite rightly not 
accountable to the public for their decisions.”146 For Sumption, courts are technical-legal 
bodies, not political and certainly not representational ones.  
Returning to Nicklinson, some Justices were again drawn to broader constitutional 
questions. Lord Neuberger devotes a considerable part of his judgement to rejecting the 
                                                          
141 Nicklinson at [230]. 
142 Lord Hughes at [259; 267].  
143 J. Sumption, “Judicial and political decision-making: the uncertain boundary - the FA Mann Lecture” (2011) 
16(4) Judicial Review 301-315. See also Lord Sumption, “The Limits of Law”, 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, 
Kuala Lumpur , 20 November 2013; Lord Sumption, “Anxious Scrutiny”, Administrative Law Bar Association 
Annual Lecture, 4 November 2014.  
144 See also the contributions made by Policy Exchange and the Judicial Power Project. 
145 Sumption, “Judicial and political decision-making”, 309. 
146 Sumption, “Judicial and political decision-making”, 312-313.  
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argument that courts are not institutionally competent to decide a case such as Nicklinson. In 
so doing, he builds up a principled case for judicial independence. Lord Neuberger reiterates 
the Osborn-Kennedy147 line of cases according to which domestic courts are competent to 
decide complex questions, like assisted suicide, autonomously, taking Strasbourg and 
national case law into account.148 He begins by acknowledging the moral arguments for and 
against permitting applicants to be assisted to kill themselves, and recognises the value of 
personal autonomy as a feature that ultimately supported the applicant’s case.149 He then cites 
cases predating the HRA to illustrate that courts are well versed in making morally 
contentious decisions: “… the courts have been ready both to assume responsibility for 
developing the law on what are literally life and death issues, and then to shoulder 
responsibility for implementing the law as so developed”.150  
Lord Neuberger concludes by asserting that the fact that Parliament had recently 
enacted a statute “cannot automatically deprive the courts of their right, indeed their 
obligation, to consider the issue”.151 He highlights two constitutional qualities of the courts. 
First, Lord Neuberger draws on their institutional competence: judges’ “relative freedom 
from pressures of the moment” better places them to take “difficult or unpopular 
decisions”.152 Second, and possibly with Lord Sumption in mind, Lord Neuberger appears to 
recognise a representational function: “[a]lthough judges are not directly accountable to the 
electorate, there are occasions when their relative freedom from pressures of the moment 
enables them to take a more detached view”.153 
                                                          
147 Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; [2014] 1 A.C. 1115; Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 
20; [2015] A.C. 455. 
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Paragraph 111 of Lord Neuberger’s judgement is perhaps the most striking in the 
decision. He lays the groundwork for a momentous decision by recognising the gravity of the 
interference with the applicant’s Art. 8 ECHR rights; by identifying the hypocrisy of official 
attitudes towards assisted suicide; by outlining the court’s similar approach under the 
common law; and by noting that “no compelling reason has been made out for the court 
simply ceding any jurisdiction to Parliament”.154 In the final analysis, however, Lord 
Neuberger deems it “institutionally inappropriate at this juncture” for the UKSC to issue a s.4 
declaration.155 Yet the tenor of his judgement is undoubtedly progressive. It cements the 
UKSC’s growing institutional independence, competence, and detachment; and it certainly 
paves the way for judicial intervention in future cases.156 
Lord Mance, in his judgement, observes that the considerable latitude given to 
assisted suicide at the international level creates scope for both Parliament and the courts to 
assess the compatibility of domestic law with human rights. Reiterating his position of 
“relative institutional competence” in an earlier case,157 Like Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance 
rejects the orthodox notion that the legislator’s choice is necessarily final.158 The judiciary 
can claim greater expertise on ex ante principles, such as personal liberty and access to 
justice. And like Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance also ascribes a representational role to courts: 
“… while the legislature is there to reflect the democratic will of the majority, the judiciary is 
there to protect minority interests, and to ensure the fair and equal treatment of all”.159 
Lord Mance, with the majority of the court, ultimately refers the issue to Parliament 
on grounds of constitutional propriety and due to the “sensitive, controversial, and emotive 
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nature of the assisted dying debate”.160 However, he also concludes his judgement with a 
strongly worded rebuke of Lord Sumption’s deferential position. Lord Mance stresses the 
court’s “constitutional role” in addressing a variety of public and private interests. While 
judges are bound by the formal constraints of legal principle, reasoning, and precedent, they 
also need to be alert to structural conditions: “very little, if any, judicial decision-making, 
especially at an appellate level, is or ought to be separated from a consideration of what is 
just or fair”.161 As a representational organ, courts need to consider the social risks to, and 
moral convictions of, the wider public in addition to the values of individual autonomy and 
dignity.162 
Assessing Nicklinson is complicated by the full panoply of judicial responses. The 
view of Lord Hughes that assisted suicide “is very clearly a decision which falls to be made 
by Parliament”163 stands in contrast to Lord Neuberger’s concern that “such an approach 
would be an abdication of judicial responsibility”.164 Yet in addition to deciding the case and 
differing over a s.4 declaration of incompatibility, the judges also reflect on the constitutional 
role and institutional competence of the UKSC. In that respect at least the judgment is more 
self-assured. First, as the highest appellate court, the UKSC ensures that cases are decided on 
the basis of coherent and consistent rules and principles. The Justices turn to personal 
autonomy, personal liberty, and access to justice, to define the freedom and equality of 
autonomous citizens living in a constitutional democracy. In that sense, courts are the 
custodians of individual justice. Second, the UKSC ensures the coherence of electoral 
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democracy (statutory law) with structural conditions (individual rights, constitutional 
principles, judicial precedent). It befits the representational role of courts that gives effect to 
legislative intent and articulates the people’s sense of justice. In that respect, courts are the 
custodians of the common law as collective memory. Finally, while Evans and Unison are a 
reminder that domestic courts have the power to review the actions of members of the 
executive to ensure that their conduct is consistent with the authorising legislation or 
constitutional principle, all three cases reinforce the view that Parliament’s judgement over 
complex social and moral matters is not necessarily determinative or conclusive. The 
decisions underline the courts’ representational role as the custodians of the rule of law and 
the constitution.  
CONCLUSION 
How should courts respond in cases involving constitutional principle and 
fundamental rights? Amidst constant reminders that the doctrine of sovereignty has not 
disappeared, the cases examined here show that consensus about automatic deference to 
Parliament or other public bodies is crumbling. The UKSC decides fundamental rights issues 
independently and authoritatively, although not always consensually. Evans reveals how the 
judges themselves were torn between deciding this case either with reference to rival 
constitutional principles or administrative law technique. Nicklinson exposed similar 
disagreement over the correct protection of human rights.  
Nonetheless, the cases suggest an approach to judicial review that falls between US-
style strike-down powers and deference to legislative intent. At their most interventionist, 
judges operate not as drivers, but as mechanics; not armed with a map, but with the tools of 
constitutional doctrine; and tasked not with steering, but with keeping the machinery of 
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democracy humming.165 Instead of invalidating the statute on constitutional grounds, the 
judges could even give the machine “a jolt designed to nudge the machine back into working 
order, a good whack with the judicial wrench”.166 The corrective method allows the UKSC to 
articulate the meaning of the UK constitution independently from politics but without 
usurping parliamentary supremacy.  
The UK constitution gives rise to complex questions on which the UKSC Justices 
may not agree, but which they also can no longer evade. The cases discussed are not isolated 
ones, and they foreshadow a more assertive and astute approach to judicial review by the 
UKSC. An honest discussion of the court’s work is needed to recognise these questions as 
compelled by the UK constitution, and to understand the heightened role of the UKSC as 
mandated by constitutional democracy.  
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